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Economic research on the food retailing
industry can be divided into two broad areas:
competition/concentration studies (i.e.,
Marion et al.) and price formation studies
(i.e., Reed and Robbins). Studies in these
areas generally conclude that the retail food
market is characterized by some degree of
price competition, but, especially in the
short-run, the industry is imperfectly com-
petitive.
Such findings are consistent with the
study by Handy and Stafford on competitive
effects of a new entrant into a local retail
food market. They found that the entrance
of a limited-assortment, no-frills warehouse
store forced increased price and non-price
competition; thus altering the competitive
structure of the local market.
This study investigates the effects of
a firm’s exit on the competitive situation
in a local retail grocery market. Prices of
sixty-eight grocery items for three firms are
compared before and after the exit announce-
ment by the fourth firm. General observations
on non-price competition are also presented.
Specifically, the objective of this paper is
to investigate the competitive reaction of
firms in the market to the withdrawal of an
established competitor.
Methodology
The analyzed market included four firms,
each considered to operate in the same market
area (a two-mile radius). The four firms from
which price data were collected can be
described as follows:
Store A: An affiliate of a local chain.
Store B: An affiliate of a national chain.
Store C: An affiliate of a regional chain.
Store D: An affiliate of a national chain.
Throughout the remainder of this paper any
references made to individual stores will be
consistent with the above terminology.
Retail prices on sixty-eight items were
collected on a weekly basis during a one-year
period beginning in February of 1981. Other
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tained by means of personal interviews with
store managers in the study area to capture
other competitive effects.
The analysis of the effect of a compet-
itor exiting the market was performed by using
descriptive statistical techniques. The pur-
pose was to identify differences in price
levels among the sample stores during the
study period which were attributable to the
exit of Store D. The analysis also provides
general price level information on each store.
In order to carry out the analysis, the
data were transformed into relative prices
to allow for comparisons of price level move-
ments between stores over time. The trans-
formation consisted of taking the ith product
in the jth store each week and dividing it
by the average price of the item in all stores
during that week. This procedure allows the
price of a specific item to be converted into
a value which reflects the price of that item
relative to the rest of the market (Handy and
Stafford). For instance, if the average price
of bread in the market is $.79 and the price
in a certain store is $.85, then the relative
price for that store during that particular
week would be 1.07 (.85/.79). Further, all
price indexes were formed weighting the in-
dividual items by typical sales quantities.
Results
The average relative prices data were
weighted by sales to derive the indexes pre-
sented in Tables 1 through 3. The tables pre-
sent the weighted average of relative prices
for each store broken down into departments
for three different time periods. The rela-
tive price indicates the level at which that
particular store sold an item relative to
the market average. That is, if the relative
price is greater than 1.0, the store was
offering that specific item at a price above
the market average, Table 1 covers week one
through week forty-nine (the period prior
to the announcement of Store D’s exit). Table
2 presents the weighted average of relative
prices during the final eight weeks (weeks
50-57) of the study. The figures for Store
D include only observations for weeks 50-54,
since the store was closed during the final
three weeks of the study. Table 3 presents
the average relative price level for each
store and department for the entire study
period.
Table 1
Weighted Average Relative Prices
By Department During Weeks 1-49
Store
...*
A B c D
Dairy 1.0081 .9820 1.0046 1.0053
Produce .9642 1.0091 1.0058 1.0209
Meat 1.0014 .9741 .9433 1,0812
Grocery .9889 .9982 .9871 1,0257
Overall .9974 .9820 .9652 1.0553
Table 1 indicates that during the first
forty-nine weeks Store A had the lowest
weighted average relative price in the produce
department, Store B had the lowest prices in
the dairy department, and Store C was lowest
in meat and grocery. Store A had the highest
prices in the dairy department and Store D
was highest in the produce, meat, and grocery
departments. The final line of Table 1 re-
ports the overall store average price level.
The results indicate that, prior to the exit
period, Store C had the lowest overall price
level followed by Store B, Store A and Store
D, respectively.
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Weighted Average Relative Prices
By Departments During Weeks 50-57
Store
A B c D
Dairy 1.0162 .9793 1.0004 1.0065
Produce .9463 .9897 1.0875 .9622
Meat 1.0151 .9622 .9553 1.1078
Grocery .9976 1.0040 .9516 1.0748
Overall 1.0073 .9750 .9695 1.0772
Table 2 illustrates the price level re-
sults for the final eight weeks of the study.
The only change in rankings for departments
was in the produce department, where the order
of two of the stores changed (Store D and
Store C switched places in the rankings).
One interesting observation is that Store B
was the only store with lower overall weighted
relative prices. Note that the mean of the
weighted relative prices do not equal 1.0
because observations on Store D were missing
for the final three weeks.
Table 3
Weighted Average Relative Prices
By Departments During Weeks 1-57
Store
A B c D
Dairy 1.0093 .9816 1.0040 1.0054
Produce .9615 1.0062 1.0179 1.0151
Meat 1.0034 .9724 .9450 1.0838
Grocery .9902 .9991 .9819 1.0305
Overall .9989 .9810 .9658 1.0575
The results in Table 3 report the average
relative prices for each store and department
for the entire study period. Again, the only
difference between the store rankings in this
period is for the produce department. The
order from lowest to highest price relative
was Store A, Store B, Store D, and Store C.
Three t-tests were used to determine
whether the differential in overall weighted
relative prices between stores changed from
weeks 1-49 and 50-57. The results of the
tests indicated that there was no significant
change (at the 5 percent level) in overall
relative prices between stores after the
announced closing of Store D.
In order to present a descriptive view
of the price levels in each store over the
study period, the overall weighted relative
price levels were calculated on a weekly basis
for each store and are plotted in Figures 1
through 4. Again, a value of 1.0 indicates
that the store was pricing at the market
average. Values greater than 1.0 are above
the market average and values less than 1.0
are below the market average. Figures 1
through 4 have no observations for weeks 32,
36 and 45 since there was incomplete data dur-
ing these weeks.
A close perusal of Figure 1 indicates
that Store A’s overall weighted price relative
varies a great deal from week to week, but
in general it was above the market average
for the first fifteen weeks, below average
for the next twenty weeks, and above the mar-
ket average for the final twenty-two weeks.
The relative price level of this store varied
from a low of .9289 (week 24) to a high of
1.0833 (week 42).
The weighted overall relative price level
of Store B (Figure 2) is above 1.0 in only
11 of the 54 weeks. The relative price level
of this store ranged from .9427 (week 46) to
1.0438 (week 33), which is the smallest vari-
ation among the four sample stores.
The weighted relative price level ob-
served in Store C (Figure 3) was even lower
than Store B for most weeks. Store C’s rela-
tive price was above the market average in
only six weeks of the sample period. The
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September 85/page 21range of relative prices in this store was
.8972 (week 47) to 1.0105 (week 45).
The observed pattern of relative prices
associated with Store D (Figure 4) is clearly
in contrast with the rest of the market.
Chain D was consistently above the market
average and priced at or below the average
in only six weeks in contrast to Stores B
and C, which were above the average in only
six and eleven weeks, respectively. This
latter point is interesting since both Store
B and D are quite similar in size and struc-
ture (nationally), yet they appear to have
been pursuing opposite pricing philosophies
in this market, The observed weighted rela-
tive price level of Store D ranged from .9732
(week 15) to 1.1233 (week 32). It should
also be noted that there are no observations
during weeks 55-57 for Store D, This is due
to the fact that it had ceased operating in
the market at that time.
The preceding information provides in-
sight into the evaluation of a competitor
exiting the market. The events leading up
to the exit of Store D were a direct result
of a reorganization of this chain which en-
tailed closing stores in the case market
region. Public notice of the closing was
given approximately six to eight weeks prior
to the actual closure (weeks 50-52).
Personal interviews with store managers
revealed that the competitors (Stores A, B
and C) learned of Store D’s exit plan at the
same time as the public. Further, several
of these managers felt that Store D did not
control a large enough share of the market
to be considered a major competitor, though
store D did have an 8 to 12 percent share of
the market.
Interviews with the store managers re-
vealed that few, if any, strategies of price
competition were employed by Store A, B and
C to capture the market share forfeited by
Store D.[1] The managers also reported that
no major deviations in their merchandising
plan occurred during the exit period. The
exit of Store D was perceived as inevitable
and thus was not expected to create any signi-
ficant disequilibrium in the market.
The only type of reaction taken by com-
petitors was the use of non-price competi-
tion. Acceptance of Store D’s check cashing
cards, stocking new products requested by
former Store D shoppers and offering couponing
specials to attract patrons of Store D were
examples of strategies utilized. Stores A,
B and C only attempted to maintain pre-exit
service standards and implemented no other
merchandising strategies.
From the data and interviews it appears
that the exit of Store D had little or no
effect in the market. Figures 2 and 3 show
that both Store B and C remained relatively
stable in terms of price during these final
weeks. Store A demonstrated a slight upward
trend during those weeks.
Conclusions and Implications
Data indicate that stores typically
differ in price levels on a weekly basis and
often have prices that move in opposite dir-
ections during the same week. However, the
general conclusion to be drawn from this
analysis is that the level of prices in this
market, and even in specific stores, remained
basically stable during the study period.
The price level analysis offers little evi-
dence of price reaction to the exit of Store
D. These conclusions were drawn using the
relative price information, but examination
of actual prices reveals the same results.
The results of this study suggest that
the level of prices within individual stores,
and even the level of prices for specific
items, tended to remain relatively stable dur-
ing the study period. However, instances of
considerable price level fluctuations were
observed. There were no strong indications
of any of the firms exhibiting drastic ten-
dencies toward change. These results appear
to suggest that individual stores tend to
operate within a “safe range” of prices. That
is, a retailer may perceive a range of prices,
for a given item, that consumers will tolerate
and will thus set a price somewhere within
this range in order to correspond with the
stores’ profit objective.
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with Handy and Stafford’s findings concerning
firm entrance. The price competition in the
firm entrance case is replaced with non-price
competition in the firm exit case. In the
former instance, the original firms in the
industry changed prices in order to keep mar-
ket share, much like many imperfectly com-
petitive models predict. However, when faced
with an opportunity to increase market share
in the firm exit case, the remaining firms
were content to divide the exiting firm’s
volume without substantial price competition.
Endnote
[1] Local officials for Stores A and C defin-
itely have the authority to change over-
all pricing strategies for the studied
market. There is evidence that Store
B has changed its pricing strategies
in recent years. Thus, it is concluded
that all stores had the flexibility to
change their pricing strategies as a
result of Store D’s exit.
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